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Free entry equilibria with positive profits: A unified
approach to quantity and price competition games
Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira∗ and Fre´de´ric Dufourt†
Free entry equilibria are usually characterized by the zero profit condition. We plead
instead for a strict application of the Nash equilibrium concept to a symmetric simul-
taneous game played by actual and potential entrants, producing under decreasing
average cost. Equilibrium is then typically indeterminate, with a number of active
firms varying between an upper bound imposed by profitability and a lower bound
required by sustainability. We use a canonical model with strategies represented by
prices, although covering standard regimes of quantity and price competition, to
show that in equilibrium the critical (profit maximizing) price must lie between the
break-even and the limit prices.
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1 Introduction
Free entry is commonly associated with zero profits. Under free entry and exit, positive
profits are supposed to stimulate creation of new firms and negative profits to induce
destruction of existent firms. A free entry equilibrium might, therefore, be seen as a
stationary state, characterized by the zero profit condition, of a dynamic process of net
business formation. This view is implicit in the concept of long-run perfectly competitive
equilibrium, and is naturally extensive to monopolistic competition, where the relevant
scales of individual firms also appear as negligible with respect to market size. As long as
profits remain positive, any entrant is then able to reproduce in an unreactive environment
the operating conditions and the proceeds of a high number of successful incumbents.
This line of argument ceases to hold, however, when a potential entrant has to compete
with a few incumbents only, all producing under internal economies of scale. In this
context, a simple replication of the incumbents’ performance cannot guarantee identical
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success to the entrant, whose environment might be seriously perturbed by that replication.
Entry must now be examined as a strategic decision, generally in a complex context,
where timing and information considerations are at stake. Faced with this difficulty, a
common attitude is to take the zero profit condition as an acceptable approximation,
in particular in macroeconomic – or, more widely, general equilibrium – modeling, and
to leave more sophisticated approaches, resorting to sequential games with incomplete
information, to industrial organization theory. This was already the position adopted in
one of the first macroeconomic papers emphasizing the role of increasing returns and
imperfect competition, and treating the number of producers as endogenous: “The story
[behind the solution concept based on the zero profit condition] can only be defended as
an approximation. Entry and exit are complicated phenomena, involving difficult game
theoretic issues that defy neat analytic formulation” (Weitzman 1982, p. 797). So, we seem
to be trapped in a dilemma: either to force a solution concept devised for non-strategic
forms of competition into the domain of oligopoly, or to resort to industrial organization
tools that might prove too complex and also too specific for an accurate macroeconomic
or general equilibrium use. The point we want to make in the present paper is that we are
by no means doomed to that dilemma. A straightforward application of the concept of
Nash equilibrium to static symmetric games reproducing standard regimes of oligopolistic
competition offers in fact a simple way out.
We owe to Shubik (1959, 1984) the idea that entry can be modeled as a simultaneous
game between actual and potential entrants, depicted as “firms-in-being”. At an equilibrium
of such a game, along with active profit maximizing firms, there might be inactive firms that
optimally decide not to produce, on the basis of correct conjectures about the actions of the
former. This asymmetry might be the consequence of some advantage of incumbents over
potential entrants, creating a barrier to entry. However, it can also prevail in a completely
symmetric game where all players are a priori indistinguishable. As a matter of fact, ex
ante symmetry is required for an accurate representation of a perfectly contestable market ,
characterized by costless entry and exit and no disadvantage for potential entrants relative
to incumbents (Baumol et al. 1982).
For a market to be perfectly contestable any observable profile of incumbents’ strategies
must be sustainable; that is, no potential entrant may be able to make a profit by becoming
active. This requirement might suggest that, as in the dynamic story of business formation,
equilibrium profits are necessarily close to zero as soon as entry is free, or the market
perfectly contestable. This is indeed true if incumbents’ capacity to earn positive profits
extends to any potential entrant, always in a position to attract enough customers, either by
simply imitating incumbents’ behavior when firms are small relative to the market, or by
slightly undercutting incumbents’ prices when competition takes place in the undifferen-
tiated Bertrand oligopoly. An example of the former alternative is competition within the
Chamberlinian “large group”, where an individual price decision has no sensible repercus-
sions on the industry price level, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Another example is Cournot
competition in an undifferentiated industry, provided the optimal scale of each firm is small
with respect to market size, so that the Cournot equilibrium outcome approximates the
long-run perfectly competitive outcome, characterized by efficiency and zero profits, as in
Novshek (1980). Yano (2006) offers an example of the latter alternative. He uses the same
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type of free entry equilibrium concept as Novshek (i.e. a Nash equilibrium of a single stage
game played in a perfectly contestable market), but, by assuming Bertrand-like competition
in an undifferentiated oligopoly,1 he obtains the long-run perfectly competitive outcome
without assuming a small firm to market ratio. At the same time, he provides a solid game
theoretic foundation to the theory of contestable markets.
These examples suggest that sustainability is not independent of the regime of compe-
tition. Instead of the “price sustainability” appearing in the original definition of Baumol
et al. (1982), which implicitly refers to Bertrand competition, we may think of a “quantity
sustainability” referring to Cournot competition, with different implications (Brock and
Scheinkman 1983; Brock 1983). However, preferably, rather than simply opposing price
and quantity sustainability, we may completely divorce the concept of sustainability from
the specific regime of competition to which it applies (d’Aspremont et al. 2000). Indeed,
along with Cournot competition, price competition within a “small group” producing
differentiated goods is another situation where the zero profit condition is not implied by
sustainability, and where multiple free entry equilibria may exist in addition to the one at
break-even prices. In such equilibria, the strategies of active firms entail positive profits
and are nevertheless sustainable because potential entrants, taking those strategies as given,
realize that, whatever they do, demand will be insufficient for attaining the scale at which
production becomes profitable. Also, under these circumstances, there is no sensible reason
for the incumbents to accommodate entry.
The objective of the present paper is to provide a unified conceptual and analytical
framework for the study of free entry equilibria, covering different regimes of oligopolistic
competition and different specifications of internal increasing returns. Our starting point
is the same as in d’Aspremont et al. (2000): we take as the relevant concept of free entry
equilibrium the standard Nash solution of a simultaneous symmetric non-cooperative
game, such that active and inactive firms coexist. Sustainability is then just the optimizing
condition that applies to inactive firms, given their correct conjectures about the decisions
of active firms. However, in the present paper, we go a step further in the way of unification:
we build a canonical model, where firms strategies are always represented by prices, but
which covers different regimes of both price and quantity competition. One advantage
of this comprehensive representation is that free entry equilibria can then be generally
characterized by the interval between the break-even and the limit prices, to which the
critical price maximizing the incumbent profit should belong. This interval induces a range
of numbers of active firms that are compatible with a free entry equilibrium: a type of
indeterminacy appearing as a robust property of oligopolistic competition in contestable
markets.
Our paper is organized as follows. We present our conceptual framework in Section 2,
by: (i) defining the concept of free entry equilibrium; (ii) introducing the canonical model
where strategies are represented by prices; and (iii) establishing equilibrium conditions on
1 As a matter of fact, in the game designed by Yano (2006), firms simultaneously choose a price and a set of
quantities that are equivalent from the point of view of the profits they generate. Together with free entry, this device
allows him to extend Bertrand equilibrium to the case where the average cost function is not constant, without
incurring the inexistence problem pointed out by Edgeworth. Yano (2005) extends this analysis to encompass
strategic technological choices.
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incumbents’ prices under general specifications of cost and demand functions. These con-
ditions are then applied in Section 3 to standard regimes of quantity and price competition
in homogeneous and differentiated markets, respectively, and the corresponding outcomes
are compared. We conclude in Section 4.
2 Oligopolistic competition with free entry
The analysis carried out in this section comprises three steps. In Subsection 2.1, we in-
troduce a fairly general, although simple, game theoretic framework applying to perfectly
contestable oligopolistic markets, and exploiting symmetry of strategy profiles (in the spirit
of Cooper and John 1988). In this context, we use in a standard way the equilibrium solution
of a simultaneous and symmetric game to define the concept of free entry equilibrium,
under the additional requirement that some firms optimally decide to remain inactive. Two
conditions characterize equilibrium: profitability and sustainability. In Subsection 2.2, we
propose a canonical model covering different regimes of competition in which incumbents’
strategies are always represented by prices, even when quantities, or locations in some char-
acteristics space, are involved (as in Cournotian or spatial competition, respectively). We
further formulate general assumptions on the cost and demand functions. In Subsection 2.3,
we translate the two conditions characterizing a free entry equilibrium into the requirement
that the common price chosen by the incumbents be a critical point of their profit function
above the break-even price (for profitability) and below the limit price (for sustainability).
These bounds on incumbents’ prices translate in turn into a non-degenerate admissible
interval to which the number of active firms should belong.
2.1 Concept of free entry equilibrium
Free entry means absence of any entry barrier accounting for some advantage of incumbents
over potential entrants. Under free entry all firms, whether established or not, are supposed
to benefit from full equality of opportunities. However, this does not imply that they are
assured of equality of results. In game theoretic terms, firms are assumed to play a symmetric
game (equality of opportunities), the equilibria of which need, however, not be symmetric
(possible inequality of results). Equilibria might display a primary kind of asymmetry (the
one which concerns us here) involving the distinction between active and inactive firms.
A free entry equilibrium is just a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric game, such that some
firms are active and some inactive. In other words, there is at least a potential entrant
optimally deciding not to actually enter .
This free entry equilibrium is usually viewed as a sub-game perfect equilibrium of
a two-stage game, with firms deciding at the first stage either to enter or not, and then
with entrants competing at the second stage according to some specified regime (typically,
quantity or price competition). The first stage entry decision, possibly implying the same
sunk cost for any entrant, does, however, not give the right to an equal treatment at the
second stage, as implicitly assumed. Under internal increasing returns, there may be active
and inactive entrants at a second stage equilibrium. Consequently, we might as well resort
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to a simultaneous game, and take entry/exit decisions as implicit in quantity and/or price
decisions (Novshek 1980; d’Aspremont et al. 2000; Corcho´n and Fradera 2002; Yano 2005,
2006).
To be explicit, consider a symmetric simultaneous game played by N competing
oligopolistic firms, each one with the same strategy space S and the same payoff func-
tion  : SN → R. A firm is inactive if it chooses an element of the subset S0 of strategies
that lead to zero output, and it is active if it chooses a strategy in the complementary subset.
The nature of the subset S0 results from the particular specification of the model, S0 being
for instance equal to {0} in quantity competition games, or to the set of prices higher than
any customer’s reservation price in price competition games. We admit that the payoff
function is constant with respect to any of its arguments over S0, if this set has more than
one element. Now consider strategy profiles s∈ SN that are symmetric within the class of n
active firms (0< n< N),2 all choosing sn ∈SS0 while N− n inactive firms indifferently
choose some element of S0. It is clear that the relevant information in s is completely
contained in the pair (sn, n). Similarly, as the vector s−i ∈SN−1 of strategies of the N− 1
competitors of any firm i has n− δ elements equal to sn (with δ= 1 if firm i is active
and δ= 0 if it is inactive) and N− 1− (n− δ) elements belonging to S0, it can be fully
characterized by the triplet (sn, n, δ). The profit  (si , s− i ) of any firm i, choosing strategy
si = s and facing a profile s−i of its competitors’ strategies with such characterization, can
then be denoted accordingly by  (s , sn, n, δ).
If we apply the Nash equilibrium concept to this framework, for a pair (sn, n) to
characterize an equilibrium, the profit (s , sn, n, 1) of an active firm must reach a maximum
at s = sn, and the profit  (s , sn, n, 0) of an inactive firm must reach a maximum at any
s0 ∈ S0. Furthermore, if we take free entry as comprehending free exit, so that sunk costs
are excluded,3 inactivity always results in zero profits, so that any equilibrium (sn, n) must
verify  (sn, sn, n, 1)≥ 0 and  (s 0, sn, n, 0)= 0.
In the usual approach,4 if n is the number of firms having chosen to enter at the first
stage, the two conditions for a free entry equilibrium (sn, n) without sunk costs are: first, that
 (s , sn, n, 1) reach a maximum non-negative value on SS0 at s = sn, and second, that
whenever this value is positive there be no equilibrium with n+ 1 entrants (symmetric with
respect to all of them). The second condition means that, for any strategy sn+ 1 ∈SS0,
if  (s , sn+1, n+ 1, 1) is maximized on SS0 at s = sn+1 then (sn+1, sn+1, n+ 1,
1)< 0. Putting together these two conditions one obtains the zero profit condition com-
monly seen as implied by free entry ((sn, sn, n, 1)= maxs ∈ SS0 (s , sn, n, 1)= 0),
provided one neglects the so-called “non-integer problem” (as n belongs to N∗, not to
R+, (sn+1, sn+1, n+ 1, 1) < 0 < (sn, sn, n, 1) is in fact the generic case).
Instead, we use the standard definition of a Nash equilibrium of a single stage game,
just characterizing separately, as best responses, the decisions of active and inactive firms:
2 We admit that n> 0 in order to eliminate trivial equilibria, and that n< N to put aside the case where entry
is impossible for lack of further participants.
3 Exclusion of sunk costs is consistent with our assumption of a simultaneous game, but is not crucial. In a
two-stage game, if all (actual) entrants incur the same positive sunk cost k at a first stage, the profit of an inactive
entrant−k is negative, instead of 0, but this translation does not fundamentally alter the argument.
4 See Go¨tz (2005) for a recent example.
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Definition 1 A non-trivial symmetric free entry equilibrium is a pair (sn, n) in (SS0)×
{1, . . . , N − 1} satisfying two conditions:
max
s ∈ S
 (s , sn, n, 1) =  (sn, sn, n, 1) ≥ 0 (profitability) and
max
s ∈ S
 (s , sn, n, 0) = max
s ∈S0
 (s , sn, n, 0) = 0 (sustainability).
For a strategy profile characterized by the pair (sn, n) to be an equilibrium, it must be
profitable for any active firm to choose the strategy sn, meaning that no higher profit is
attainable either while staying active ((·, sn, n, 1) is maximized at sn) or through becoming
inactive ((sn, sn, n, 1) is non-negative). The strategy profile must also be sustainable with
respect to inactive firms, meaning that these firms should not be able to obtain a positive
profit by becoming active.
2.2 A canonical pricing model
To be more specific and still cover different regimes of competition with a unified frame-
work, we now introduce a simple model where strategies, whatever their nature, can be
represented by prices. Take an industry producing either a homogeneous or a composite
good sold at price P. Demand for this good is given by a twice differentiable decreas-
ing function D : (0, P˜ ) → (0, ∞), with P˜ ∈ (0, ∞], continuously extended for P ≥ P˜ as
D(P )= 0. The good is potentially produced by N firms, under internal increasing returns,
with the same twice differentiable increasing cost function C : (0, ∞) → (0, ∞), extended
to C(0)= 0 (no sunk costs) and such that average cost C(y)/y is decreasing on (0, ∞).
As in the preceding subsection, we restrict our analysis to equilibria that are symmetric
with respect to n active firms (0< n< N), all choosing the same strategy sn ∈ SS0. This
strategy will always be represented by the price pn at which any active firm intends to sell
its output. Therefore, any firm deciding to supply quantity y at price p, and facing demand
d(p, pn, n, δ), has to solve a problem that can be stated as follows:
max
(p, y)∈R2+
{py − C (y) : y ≤ d (p, pn, n, δ)} . (1)
Clearly, a pair (p, y) such that 0< y < d(p, pn, n, δ) cannot be a solution to this problem,
because the profit is increasing in y if C(y)/y ≤ p. Therefore, the firm will always decide
either to produce y= d(p, pn, n, δ) or to stay inactive (i.e. to choose y= 0), so that we can
directly refer to the canonical program (CP) in the single decision variable p
max
p ∈R+
{pd (p, pn, n, δ)− C (d (p, pn, n, δ))} , (CP)
and then check that the maximum profit is non-negative, taking otherwise y= 0 as the
optimal decision.
One sees immediately that the CP covers the case where firms produce differentiated
goods and compete in prices. It is less evident yet true that it also covers for instance the case
of a homogeneous oligopoly with Cournotian firms. Indeed, given symmetry with respect
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to n active firms, each one of these firms chooses pn = P and yn = D(P )/n, whereas N− n
inactive firms all choose y= 0. The residual demand at price p for any firm, whether active
(δ= 1) or inactive (δ= 0) is D(p)− (n− δ)yn = D(p)− (1− δ/n)D(pn)≡ d(p, pn, n, δ).
As y= d(p, pn, n, δ) if and only if D(p)= (n− δ) yn + y, the CP is indeed equivalent to
the standard program of the Cournotian firm; namely, maxy ∈R+ {D−1((n − δ)yn + y)y −
C(y)}.
The specific form of contingent demand to the firm d(·, pn, n, δ), of which the
Cournotian contingent demand is just an example, depends on the assumed regime of
competition. However, we can establish a general relation between the demand to the ac-
tive firm d(pn, pn, n, 1) as a function of pn (the price set by all the n active firms) and the
demand to the industry:
nα(n)d(pn, pn, n, 1)= D(P ), with P = pn/α(n), (2)
where α(n) is a positive aggregating factor to be used when the product is a composite good
(α(n)≡ 1, otherwise).5
We now introduce two general assumptions on the cost and demand functions. The
first expresses existence of internal increasing returns to scale (yet not at an increasing rate).
Formally:6
Assumption 1 The function C(y)/y is twice differentiable and has a negative, non-decreasing
elasticity (ǫyC(y)− 1< 0, ǫ2yy C(y)≥ 0) in the interval (0,∞).
The second assumption is introduced to ensure that the profit function is well-behaved and
has adequate boundary properties, namely, that it takes negative values when the scale of
production is either too small or too large. It further ensures that the demand to any firm,
hence its average revenue, is larger for the incumbent than for the potential entrant (as
the former competes with only n− 1 producing firms, whereas the latter faces one more
competitor). Formally:
Assumption 2 For any triplet (pn, n, δ), the function d(·, pn, n, δ) is twice differentiable
in the interval (0, p˜(pn, n, δ)) in which it is positive (where p˜(pn, n, δ)∈ (0, ∞] is the
supremum of customers’ reservation prices), and has in this interval a negative, decreasing
elasticity (ǫpd(·, pn, n, δ)< 0, ǫ2ppd(·, pn, n, δ)> 0), such that
1
limp→0 ǫpd (p, pn, n, δ)
< lim
y→∞
ǫyC (y)− 1 and (3)
1
limp→ p˜(pn ,n,δ) ǫpd (p, pn, n, δ)
> lim
y→0
ǫyC (y)− 1. (4)
5 Deflating the price pn by the aggregating factor in the definition of the price index, P (the price of the composite
good), ensures that the aggregate expenditure, PD(P), in the industry is indeed equal to the sum npnd(pn , pn , n, 1)
of firms revenues. A well-known example of the use of such price and quantity indices for industries producing
a composite commodity is afforded by the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework (where α(n)= n1/(σ − 1), with σ
the constant elasticity of substitution between elementary goods). For a more general analysis, see d’Aspremont
et al. (2007).
6 We denote ǫx f (x , y)≡ (∂ f (x , y)/∂x) x/ f (x , y) the partial elasticity of f at (x , y) with respect to x. All related
elasticity notations are self-explanatory.
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AR (δ = 1)
AR (δ = 0)
AC
ln y
ln p
Figure 1 Average cost (AC) and revenue (AR) curves.
Furthermore, for any p, the function d(p, ·) is increasing in pn and δ, and non-increasing in
n, as long as its value remains positive.
Geometrically, as illustrated by Figure 1, Assumption 1 states that the average cost
curve, C(y)/y, is decreasing and convex when represented on a diagram with logarithmic
scales (see curve AC, with slope ǫyC(y)− 1). Assumption 2 states that the average revenue
curve (given by the inverse of the function d(·, pn, n, δ)) is decreasing, strictly concave,
and always lower than the average cost curve for an output either close to zero or close to
infinity (see curves AR, with slopes 1/ǫpd(p, pn, n, δ)).
In this diagram, the profitability condition requires that the average revenue curve of
an active firm AR (δ= 1) be higher than the average cost curve, AC, for intermediate values
of y, whereas the sustainability condition requires that the average revenue curve of an
inactive firm, AR (δ= 0), be lower than the average cost curve, AC, for all values of y. The
two conditions are compatible because average revenue is increasing in δ by Assumption 2.
The curve that is tangent to the average cost curve corresponds to the limit case of a price
pn such that a potential entrant can at most make a zero profit if it decides to become active.
We will come back to this limit price in the following subsection.
As a last remark, it should be noticed that twice differentiability of the function
d(·, pn, n, δ) is more than a technical assumption. Indeed, it excludes the case of Bertrand
competition (price competition in a homogeneous oligopoly) because d(·, pn, n, δ) has
then a discontinuity at p= pn.
2.3 Equilibrium conditions
Under the assumptions of the preceding subsection, we can reformulate the profitability
and the sustainability conditions in terms of the price pn set (or targeted) by all the n active
firms. Profitability requires that this price be an interior solution to the CP (hence, a critical
point of the corresponding profit function (·, pn, n, 1)), and that this critical price be at
least equal to the break-even price, entailing zero profits. By contrast, sustainability requires
that the critical price be at most equal to the limit price deterring entry. In the following, we
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are going to give formal definitions of these three reference prices, and examine sufficiency
of the above conditions.
Definition 2 A critical price p∗n is a positive price that, when simultaneously set by n active
firms, satisfies the first order condition necessary for an interior solution of CP; that is,
solves the equation of marginal revenue with marginal cost:
pn(1+ 1/ǫpd(pn, pn, n, 1))=C ′(d(pn, pn, n, 1)). (FOC)
If the critical price p∗n entails non-negative profits, this first order condition is in fact
sufficient, under our assumptions, for an interior solution of the CP, in spite of the possible
lack of quasi-concavity of (·, pn, n, 1), because of the non-convexity of the cost function.
Profitability is then satisfied at p∗n, as stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Profitability I) Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the symmetric strategy profile rep-
resented by the pair (p∗n , n)∈R+ + × {1, . . . , N − 1} satisfies the profitability condition if
and only if p∗n is a critical price entailing non-negative profits or, equivalently, leading to a
revenue-cost ratio at least equal to one:
g
(
p∗n , n
) ≡ p∗nd (p∗n , p∗n , n, 1)
C
(
d
(
p∗n , p∗n , n, 1
)) ≥ 1. (PNNC)
PROOF: See Appendix. 
Now, notice that for an increasing function g (·, n), condition (PNNC) can equivalently
be expressed by requiring that the critical price be at least equal to the break-even price
p(n), which entails zero profits, or equivalently leads to a unit value of the revenue–cost
ratio. We formalize and develop this idea in the following. To begin with, we give a general
definition of the break-even price, independently of g (·, n) being an increasing function.
To understand this definition, recall that P˜ is the price, possibly infinite, at which demand
becomes nil, and that the price P of the composite good is equal to pn deflated by the
aggregating factor α(n).
Definition 3 The break-even price p(n), is the lowest price pn that, when set by all the n
active firms, allows them to get non-negative profits: p(n) ≡ inf P(n), with
P(n) ≡ {pn ∈ (0, α(n) P˜ ) : g (pn, n) ≥ 1} (5)
(by convention, p(n)=∞ if P(n)=∅).
As just observed, the profitability requirement can be equivalently expressed by the
inequality p∗n ≥ p(n) (where p∗n is a critical price), provided g (·, n) is an increasing
function, a property that is verified when the demand to the industry has an elasticity
that is always at least equal to− 1. Otherwise, the market revenue, PD(P), may decrease
with P, imposing an upper bound on the set P(n), so that the preceding inequality
is only a necessary (but in general not sufficient) condition for profitability. However,
under the following additional assumption, implying in particular quasi-concavity of the
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function g (·, n), that inequality remains a sufficient condition for profitability, as stated in
Lemma 2.
Assumption 3 Demand to the industry has an elasticity ǫP D(·) that is non-increasing
whenever smaller than −1. The elasticity ǫyC ′(y) of marginal cost is larger, for any y, than
the least upper bound 1/ limP→ P˜ ǫP D(P ) of the elasticity of inverse demand.
Lemma 2 (Profitability II) Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the symmetric strategy profile
represented by the pair (p∗n , n)∈R+ + × {1, . . . , N − 1} satisfies the profitability condition
if and only if p∗n is a critical price at least equal to the break-even price: p
∗
n ≥ p(n).
PROOF: See Appendix. 
Finally, we introduce the concept of limit price, to be taken as un upper bound imposed
on the critical price so as to ensure sustainability. This price is defined as “the highest
common price which the established seller(s) believe they can charge without inducing at
least one increment to entry” (Bain 1949, p. 454). This is the price leading to an average
revenue curve of the potential entrant that is just below the average cost curve (Modigliani
1958), as represented by the curve that is tangent to curve AC in Figure 1. Formally:
Definition 4 The limit price, p(n), is the highest price pn that, when set by all the n active
firms, prevents an inactive firm from getting positive profits: p(n) ≡ supP(n), with
P(n) ≡
{
pn ∈ (0, α(n) P˜ ) : max
p ∈ (0, p˜(pn ,n,0))
G(p, pn, n) ≤ 1
}
, (6)
with G(p, pn, n) ≡ pd(p, pn ,n,0)C(d(p, pn ,n,0)) and p˜(pn, n, 0) as defined in Assumption 2.
Observe that the elasticity with respect to p of the revenue–cost ratio G is
ǫp G(p, pn, n)= 1+ (1− ǫyC (d(p, pn, n, 0))) ǫpd(p, pn, n, 0). (7)
Hence, by inequalities (3) and (4) in Assumption 2, this elasticity is positive for p close
to zero and negative for p close to p˜(pn, n, 0), implying that G(·, pn, n) has indeed an
interior maximum. Therefore, we can determine the limit price, p(n), as the solution in pn
to equations:
pd (p, pn, n, 0) = C (d (p, pn, n, 0)) (8)
−ǫpd(p, pn, n, 0) =
1
1− ǫyC (d (p, pn, n, 0))
; (9)
namely, the zero profit condition and the first order condition for maximization of
G(·, pn, n), respectively.
Given Definition 4, we can now reformulate the sustainability condition by reference
to the limit price, p(n).
Lemma 3 (Sustainability) Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the condition pn ≤ p(n) is necessary
and sufficient for the pair (pn, n)∈R+ + × {1, . . . , N − 1} to satisfy the sustainability
condition.
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PROOF: See Appendix. 
We summarize in the following proposition the results stated in the two last lemmata.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, a symmetric profile represented by the pair
(p∗n , n)∈R+ + × {1, . . . , N − 1} is a free entry equilibrium if and only if p∗n is a critical
price between the break-even price and the limit price: p(n) ≤ p∗n ≤ p(n).
Figure 2 provides a representation of this equilibrium condition in the space (n, pn),
where the critical, break-even and limit prices appear as functions p∗(·), p(·) and p(·) of
a real (instead of an integer) number n.7 Observe how the condition p(n) ≤ p∗n ≤ p(n),
resulting in the thick segment of the critical price curve, translates into a restriction on the
number n of active firms. This number should belong to the interval [n, n], with endpoints
defined by p∗(n)= p(n) and p∗(n)= p(n).
Obviously, as soon as the interval [n, n] contains more than one integer, the profitability
and sustainability conditions are compatible with existence of free entry equilibria with
positive profits, along with the one determined by the zero profit condition (corresponding
to a number of active firms equal to the highest integer in the interval, precisely equal to
n in this particular example). It is worthwhile emphasizing that this source of equilibrium
multiplicity differs from the one usually considered in the coordination failures literature
and stemming from the seminal paper of Cooper and John (1988). In this literature, multiple
symmetric equilibria are associated with the same exogenous number n= N of players (thus
resulting, in our framework, in a multi-valued function p∗(·)). Such multiplicity relies on
7 The case represented in Figure 2 corresponds to price competition in a differentiated oligopoly with a constant
elasticity of substitution aggregator (Dixit–Stiglitz), where we have assumed a unit-elastic demand to the industry,
with constant expenditure normalized to unity, a constant elasticity of substitution within the industry equal to 6,
and a constant elasticity of the marginal cost function equal to−0.2. To facilitate comparisons between regimes of
competition, we have chosen the parameter values so as to ensure that the critical and break-even price functions
intersect at the same integer value n.
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strategic complementarity, resulting in the requirement that the best response of p be
an increasing function of pn. No such condition is necessary in our approach, because
symmetry is now imposed only within each class of active and inactive firms. This explains
why, as we are going to show, equilibrium multiplicity can prevail even under strategic
substitutability, as it is typically the case under Cournot competition.
3 Regimes of competition
To illustrate the potential of our analytical framework, we now apply it to two standard
regimes of quantity and price competition. As for quantity competition, we limit our
analysis to the Cournot homogeneous oligopoly. As for price competition, we must refer
to a market for differentiated products, because the Bertrand homogeneous oligopoly is
outside our scope and leads, at free entry equilibrium, to the competitive outcome (Yano
2005, 2006). We might for instance use the well-known Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model,
modified so as to account for manipulability of the industry price index by each one of a
“small group” of active firms (d’Aspremont et al. 1996). However, because this model has
already been treated in this perspective by d’Aspremont et al. (2000), we shall devote our
analysis of price competition to the Salop (1979) spatial model, where the strategy variables
include, besides prices, locations in the characteristics space.
3.1 Quantity competition with product homogeneity: the Cournot model
There are two sources of decreasing average cost; namely, the presence of a fixed cost
and the existence of internal economies of scale accounting for decreasing marginal cost.
These two sources are not equivalent, as attested by their specific effects in the Dixit–
Stiglitz model, where multiple free entry equilibria generally exist when marginal cost is an
isoelastic decreasing function, but never when it is constant, in the presence of a fixed cost
(d’Aspremont et al. 2000).8 However, in the two regimes of competition we are going to
analyze, the weaker source of decreasing average cost is sufficient to ensure multiplicity of
free entry equilibria and, hence, to illustrate the use of our framework. For simplicity, we
shall accordingly assume a positive fixed (non sunk) cost,φ, and a constant positive marginal
cost, normalized to one: C(y)=φ+ y if y > 0 and C(0)= 0, a function that clearly satisfies
Assumption 1. On the demand side we assume, also in the analysis of both regimes, a unit-
elastic demand to the industry, D(P )= b/P , with b > 0, satisfying Assumption 3.9 One
advantage of this specification is that the break-even price becomes independent of the
particular regime of competition we are considering, because expenditure b in the industry
is not affected by price changes. The break-even price is then given by
p(n)= 1
1− nφ/b , (10)
8 In the latter case, the admissible interval [n , n] is still non-degenerate, but it contains at most one integer, the
one determined by the zero profit condition.
9 Equilibrium with a single active firm will consequently be excluded.
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an increasing function of the number n of active firms and of the share φ/b of individual
fixed cost in aggregate expenditure.
With this specification of the demand to the industry and according to what has already
been shown in Subsection 2.2, the Cournotian contingent demand can be expressed in a
symmetric configuration as
d (p, pn, n, δ) = b
(
1
p
− 1− δ/n
pn
)
, (11)
where p is the market price aimed at by the firm and pn = b/nyn the price representing the
strategy yn expected from each one of its n− δ active competitors (with δ= 1 if the firm is
itself active, δ= 0 otherwise). This function has a partial elasticity with respect to p (for p
in the interval (0, pn/(1− δ/n)) in which individual demand is positive and finite) given
by
ǫpd(p, pn, n, δ)= −
1
1− (1− δ/n)(p/pn)
. (12)
It is easy to check that it satisfies Assumption 2, and that ǫpd(pn, pn, n, 1)=−n.
From (11), we see that the contingent demand to the inactive firm is independent of
the number n of active firms, so that the limit price is itself constant in n:10
p(n)= 1
(1−√φ/b)2 , (13)
again an increasing function of the share φ/b of individual fixed cost in aggregate expen-
diture. As to the critical price, it is simply equal to the markup factor µ (n)= n/(n− 1) on
marginal cost (multiplied by 1, the normalized marginal cost):
p∗(n)= n
n − 1 . (14)
Profit non-negativity (p∗(n) ≥ p(n)) requires, by (10),
n ≤
√
b/φ ≡ n, (15)
an upper bound that must be at least equal to 2, for a free entry equilibrium to exist, so
thatφ/b≤ 1/4 is a necessary condition for existence. Sustainability (p∗(n) ≤ p(n)) in turn
requires:
n ≥ n
2− 1/n ≡ n. (16)
Notice that the admissible interval [n, n] contains more than one integer for n ≥ 3; that
is, for a small enough degree of economies of scale, as determined by the share φ/b of
individual fixed cost in aggregate expenditure, which should not exceed 1/9. The degree
of indeterminacy increases with n; that is, it is larger the smaller the degree of economies
10 Using (11) withδ= 0, we get from (8) py= b(1− p/pn)=φ+ y, so that pn = [b/(b− (φ+ y))] [(φ+ y)/y].
From (9), we get p/pn = y/(φ+ y). Hence, φ+ y =
√
φb, and, finally, pn = 1/(1−
√
φ/b)2.
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Figure 3 Equilibrium conditions in the Cournot model.
of scale. However, a low degree of economies of scale results in a relatively large number of
active firms, reducing the impact of variations in n on the markup factor (and, hence, on
the equilibrium price). Figure 3 gives an illustration (for φ/b= 0.04 and similarly to
Figure 2) of the conditions demanded from the critical, break-even and limit prices to ensure
profitability and sustainability. For the sake of a comparison with the price competition
regime, notice that the set of candidate numbers of active firms in a free entry equilibrium
is {3, 4, 5} in this particular case.
3.2 Price competition with strategic product differentiation: the Salop model
In the industrial organization literature, spatial competition is a popular alternative to non-
address models relying on constant elasticity of substitution or quadratic consumers’ utility
functions. Although less frequent in macroeconomic modeling, it has, for instance, already
been used by Weitzman (1982), who introduced a macroeconomic version of the Salop
(1979) model of the circular city. The space of characteristics of the industry good is repre-
sented by a circle with perimeter equal to 1, on which consumers’ locations are uniformly
distributed with unit density. A consumer devoting a positive budget b to the purchase of
that good and located at point x between two firms j and j + 1, which are themselves located
at a j and a j+1, respectively, will buy from firm j if pj + τ (x − a j )< pj+1 + τ (a j+1 − x),
where pj and pj+1 are the prices set by the two firms and τ is the subjective transportation
rate in money equivalent units. The marginal consumer who is indifferent between the two
suppliers is the one located at point x ( j, j + 1)= (a j + a j+1)/2+ (pj+1 − pj )/2τ , so that the
market area of firm j is
x( j , j + 1)− x( j−1, j ) =
a j + 1− a j−1
2
+ (p j−1 + p j + 1)/2− p j
τ
, (17)
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which is independent upon its own location a j . However, although indifferent about its
precise location within its market area, firm j is assumed to set its price, pj , on the basis of its
conjectures not only about prices pj − 1 and pj+1 but also about the locations a j − 1 and a j+1
simultaneously chosen by its neighbors. This implies in particular that, when inactive at the
strategy profile taken as reference, a deviating firm does not conjecture that the locations
of the two competitors between which it decides to locate are going to be benevolently
accommodated in response to its decision to deviate into activity. As a consequence, any
deviating firm is able to manipulate its market area through its pricing decision, within the
segment separating its two neighbors, but the length of this segment is 2/n if the firm is
active and only 1/n if it is inactive (assuming that locations are symmetric with respect to
the n active firms).
On the basis of symmetry with respect to both locations and prices, we obtain from (17)
the following expression for contingent demand to the representative firm (with δ= 1 if it
is active, δ= 0 otherwise):
d(p, pn, n, δ)= (b/τ p)((1+ δ)τ/2n+ pn − p), (18)
with p ∈ (0, (1+ δ) τ/2n+ pn]. The partial elasticity of d(p, pn, n, δ) with respect to p is:
ǫpd (p, pn, n, δ) = −
(1+ δ) τ/2n+ pn
(1+ δ) τ/2n+ pn − p
. (19)
All the conditions of Assumption 2 are again satisfied.
Because ǫpd(pn, pn, n, 1)=−(1+ npn/τ ), the markup factor on the marginal cost
is µ= 1+ τ/npn, so that we obtain the following expression for the critical price as a
(decreasing) function of n:
p∗(n)=µ∗= 1
2
+
√
1
4
+ τ
n
. (20)
Profit non-negativity (p∗(n) ≥ p(n)) imposes, by this equation and equation (10), an
upper bound on the number n of active firms:
n ≤ τ√
τφ/b(1+√τφ/b) ≡ n, (21)
which must be at least equal to 2 for existence of a free entry equilibrium, so that the ratio
φ/b cannot be too large. The upper bound n on the number of active firms is increasing
in the transportation rate, τ (representing the degree of product differentiation), and
decreasing in the share φ/b of individual fixed cost in aggregate expenditure (determining
the degree of internal economies of scale). Finally, equations (8) and (9) lead to the limit
price11
p(n)= (1+
√
τφ/b)2− τ/2n, (22)
11 Using (18) with δ= 0, we obtain from (8) py= (b/τ )(τ/2n+ pn − p)=φ+ y. Also, using (19) with δ= 0,
we get from (9): p/(pn − p+ τ/2n)= y/φ. These equations together entail: y =
√
bφ/τ and p= 1+√τφ/b,
and then pn = (1+
√
τφ/b)2 − τ/2n.
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and, after a straightforward computation, to the lower bound imposed by sustainability
(p∗(n) ≤ p(n)):
n ≥ τ
(
√
2(1+√τφ/b)2 + 1/4− 1)2 − 1/4
≡ n. (23)
It can easily be checked that the ratio n/n between the endpoints of the admissible
interval [n, n] is a decreasing function of the variable
√
τφ/b, which tends to 3/4 as this
variable tends to zero. As a consequence, the admissible interval contains at least two
integers if n ≥ 4, which requires a small enough share of individual fixed cost in aggregate
expenditure (φ/b < 1/4) and a high enough degree of product differentiation as measured
by τ . We represent in Figure 4 (for the same value 0.04 of the ratio φ/b and for τ = 25/16,
so as to get the same n= 5 and the same p∗(n)=µ(n)= 1.25 as in Figure 3)12 the free entry
equilibrium conditions in terms of the critical, break-even and limit prices. Observe that
the set of numbers of active firms compatible with free entry equilibrium is now {4, 5}, a
proper subset of the corresponding set under quantity competition.
We can now formulate a tentative conclusion of the analysis performed in this section.
The degree of internal economies of scale (here determined by the share φ/b of the indi-
vidual fixed cost in the aggregate expenditure) must be low enough to ensure existence,
and even more so to entail multiplicity, of free entry equilibria. However, as the share φ/b
becomes smaller, the amplitude of price variations across equilibria becomes smaller too.
Under price competition, existence and especially multiplicity also require a high enough
degree of product differentiation (here represented by the rate of transportation τ ) and
a correspondingly high degree of market power. Sustainability (as indicated by the level
of the lower bound n on the admissible number of active firms, given the same upper
bound n) is harder to ensure under price competition than under quantity competition,
12 Imposing either the same upper bound n or the same corresponding critical price p∗(n)= p(n) leads to the
relation:
√
τ = 1/(1−√φ/b). The choice of the numerical value φ/b= 0.04 then implies τ = 25/16.
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where potential entrants expect incumbents to stick to specific output levels. However,
price sustainability remains compatible with positive profits under strategic product differ-
entiation, where potential entrants at least expect incumbents to stick to specific locations
in the characteristics space. In the non-address model of Dixit and Stiglitz, where potential
entrants have no disadvantage relative to incumbents as regards the capacity to benefit
from product differentiation, the presence of a fixed cost is, however, not enough to ensure
sustainability along with positive profits.
4 Conclusion
We have argued in this paper that, in spite of an almost universal convention, zero profits
should not be imposed as an equilibrium condition under free entry, beyond the realm
of non-strategic forms of competition. A straightforward application of the Nash equi-
librium concept to standard simultaneous symmetric games, portraying diverse regimes
of oligopolistic competition, typically entails multiple free entry equilibria with various
adjacent numbers of active firms and different levels of positive profits. These equilibria
are characterized by two conditions: profitability (the price should be no smaller than the
break-even price) and sustainability (the price should be no larger than the limit price).
These conditions define a non-degenerate interval of admissible numbers of active firms,
that typically contains more than one integer. The zero profit condition then appears as
no more than a particular selection criterion, picking up the least profitable equilibrium,
associated with the highest integer in this interval. Our analytical framework and the inde-
terminacy results that it allows us to establish are quite robust, and apply to both quantity
and price competition; although the latter regime, in particular under non-strategic forms
of product differentiation, makes sustainability harder to attain when profits are positive.
Beyond industrial organization, the indeterminacy of free entry equilibrium has po-
tentially significant macroeconomic implications. In particular, it raises a coordination
problem and, consequently, favors the emergence, even under dynamic determinacy, of
sunspot fluctuations. These might be induced by some extrinsic, potentially varying, pub-
lic signal on which firms in each industry need to coordinate (Dos Santos Ferreira and
Dufourt 2006; Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga 2003). Also, taking into account this
particular type of indeterminacy enlarges the scope for coordination failures, which cease
in particular to depend upon strategic complementarity.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (Profitability I)
Take a pair (p∗n , n)∈R+ + × {1, . . . , N − 1}. Equation (FOC) in Definition 2 (i.e. the equality of marginal
revenue and marginal cost) is the necessary first order condition for an interior solution of the CP. Hence, the
condition that p∗n be a critical price entailing non-negative profits is clearly necessary for profitability. Let us
examine if it is sufficient. A sufficient second order condition for a local maximum is that the marginal revenue
decrease faster with y (increase faster with p) than the marginal cost; that is, that the elasticity with respect to p of
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the left-hand side of (FOC) be larger than the corresponding elasticity of the right-hand side:
1−
ǫ2ppd
(
p∗n , p
∗
n , n, 1
)
1+ ǫpd
(
p∗n , p∗n , n, 1
) >ǫy C ′ (d (p∗n , p∗n , n, 1)) ǫpd (p∗n , p∗n , n, 1) . (SOC)
By Assumption 2 and given (FOC) (implying 1+ ǫpd(p∗n , p∗n , n, 1)< 0), the left-hand side of inequality (SOC)
is larger than one, so that the inequality is satisfied if the right-hand side is not larger than one. This is always
the case if marginal cost is non-decreasing. Otherwise, if ǫy C
′(y∗)< 0 (with y∗= d(p∗n , p∗n , n, 1)), the profit
non-negativity condition (PNNC), by (FOC) and Assumption 1, can be expressed for a critical price as
ǫpd
(
p∗n , p
∗
n , n, 1
) ≥ 1
ǫy C
(
d
(
p∗n , p∗n , n, 1
))− 1 . (PNNC∗)
This inequality implies that the right-hand side of (SOC) is indeed at most equal to
ǫy C
′ (y∗)
ǫy C (y∗)− 1
= 1+
ǫ2yy C (y
∗)
ǫy C (y∗)− 1
≤ 1,
by Assumption 1, thus verifying condition (SOC). Hence, the profit function has a local interior non-negative
maximum at any critical price p∗n satisfying (PNNC). This maximum is in fact a global maximum. Indeed, by
differntiability of the profit function, if there were two maxima, they would be separated by a minimum satisfying
(FOC) and violating (SOC), hence (PNNC) (and (PNNC*)). However, if profit has a negative minimum at some
price, then it cannot have a positive maximum at a higher price, because ǫpd(·, p∗n , n, 1) (in the left-hand side
of (PNNC*)) is decreasing and ǫy C (d(·, p∗n , n, 1)) (in the right-hand side) is non-increasing, so that (PNNC*)
cannot be satisfied at this higher price. 
Proof of Lemma 2 (Profitability II)
Using equation (2) relating demand to the active firm and demand to the industry, we can compute the elasticity
with respect to pn of the revenue–cost ratio g (pn , n) defined in Lemma 1:
ǫpn g (pn , n) = 1+
(
1− ǫy C (D (pn/α(n)) /nα(n))
)
ǫP D (pn/α(n)) . (24)
There are two cases. If ǫP D(P )∈[−1, 0) for any P ∈ (0, P˜ ), this elasticity is positive by Assumption 1. The
function g (·, n) is then increasing, so that the condition g (pn , n)≥ 1 in Lemma 1 can be immediately replaced
by the condition pn ≥ p(n), with g (p(n), n)= 1. If ǫP D(P )<−1 for some P, the elasticity ǫpn g (pn , n) might
be non-positive. The right-hand side of (24) is then non-increasing in pn , either through the elasticity of the
cost function (by Assumption 1), or through ǫP D(pn/α(n)) (by Assumption 3). Hence, once non-positive, the
elasticity ǫpn g (pn , n) can never become positive again. In other words, the function g (·, n) is quasi-concave, and
the set P(n) of prices entailing non-negative profits, defined by (5), is an interval.
Next, we show that the joint profit ̂(P , n) ≡ P D(P )− nC (D(P )/nα(n)), computed under the constraint
that every firm produce the same quantity, is increasing at a price P = p∗n/α(n), such that p∗n is a critical price.
Consider the derivative with respect to P of the joint profit function:
∂̂ (P , n)
∂ P
= D (P )
[
1+
(
α(n)P − C ′ (D (P ) /nα(n))
α(n)P
)
ǫP D (P )
]
, (25)
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and replace α(n) P by p∗n , using the first order condition that defines a critical price:
∂̂
(
p∗n/α(n), n
)
∂ P
= D (p∗n/α(n))
[
1− ǫP D
(
p∗n/α(n)
)
ǫpd
(
p∗n , p∗n , n, 1
)]
= D (p∗n/α(n))
[
− ǫpn d
(
p∗n , p
∗
n , n, 1
)
ǫpd
(
p∗n , p∗n , n, 1
) ] . (26)
By Assumption 2, this derivative is positive. Also, ∂̂(P , n)/∂ P becomes negative at zero by Assumption 3,
because ǫP D(P ) is non-increasing and since ǫy C
′(D(P )/nα(n)) ǫP D(P )< 1 for any P. Hence, the joint profit
function ̂(·, n) is (strictly) quasi-concave, so that supP ∈ (0, P˜ ) ̂(P , n)> p∗n/α(n). Also, supP ̂(P , n), unless
infinite, must belong to the set P(n) of prices entailing non-negative profits. In any case, as this set is an interval,
p(n) ≤ p∗n <α(n) supP ̂(P , n) implies: p∗n ∈P(n). 
Proof of Lemma 3 (Sustainability)
As d(p, ·, n, 0) is increasing (by Assumption 2), and C (y)/y is decreasing in y (by Assumption 1), the revenue–cost
ratio G(p, pn , n) is increasing in pn . By definition of the limit price p(n), G( p̂, p(n), n)= 1 at p̂ maximizing
G(·, p(n), n). Hence, pn ≤ p(n) is clearly a necessary condition for sustainability (G( p̂, pn , n)> 1 if pn > p(n)).
For sufficiency, consider pn < p(n) and G(p, pn , n)> 1 for some p. Then, G(p, p(n), n)> 1, contradicting the
definition of p(n). 
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